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INTRODUCTION

A person whose family income is $75,000 or more is almost twice as
likely to be in "excellent" health than someone with family income of less
than $20,000.'
Nearly twenty-two million persons delayed medical care in the last year
because of its cost; over fifteen million additional individuals did not
receive the care they needed at all due to the expense.2
Persons in the lowest income group are five times as likely as persons in
the highest income group to delay medical care due to cost and about ten
times as likely not to get needed medical care.3
A substantial amount of academic literature is dedicated to potential
strategies for remedying these inequities in the provision of health care in
the United States. Yet, only a small portion of this writing considers the
impact of intellectual property rights on the pricing and availability of
modem medical advancements. Rather, the published research in this field
focuses predominately on the intersection of patent law with medical
procedures, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical drugs. Of course, an
examination of these areas is undeniably important to determining how to
best shape legal institutions to foster the progress of knowledge and the
innovation of technology in the medical sciences.
* Kristen Nugent attends the University of Virginia School of Law and will begin work in the
Atlanta office of King & Spalding in the fall of 2008. Her academic research and writing

focuses on current legal and ethical issues in medicine, intellectual property, and cyberspace.
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1.
PATRICIA F. ADAMS ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, SERIES 10,
No. 233, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR THE U.S. POPULATION: NATIONAL HEALTH

INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2005, VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 4 (2007).

2.
3.

Id. at 6.
Id.
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However, this article seeks to explore an often-overlooked segment of
this debate: whether the current patent system strikes the optimal balance
between providing incentives to inventors to bring new medical devices to
the marketplace, and promoting public health by making these medical
devices available at a reasonable price. If the system is not balanced, then
the issue becomes whether there are alternatives to the existing institutions
that can better achieve this goal.
In order to answer these questions, this article undertakes a multi-step
analysis. Part I offers an overview of current patent law, with an emphasis
on medical devices. For the purpose of analogy and contrast, Part I also
considers the special rules that apply to medical procedures and drugs. Part
II explains how ethical and economic considerations suggest the need for an
alternative system in the medical device sector. Part III analyzes the
difficulties with implementing a new compensation system for medical
devices despite relevant patent and business traditions. Part IV notes some
of the unique characteristics of the medical, academic, and research
professions that may counteract the concerns discussed in Part III and
justify unique treatment of medical devices. Finally, Part V discusses the
benefits and drawbacks of several alternatives to the current patent system,
including government intervention in the form of grants, awards, and tax
breaks; compulsory licenses; shortened patent terms; increased reliance on
trade secret protection; or some combination of these options.
Based on this analysis, this article concludes that the medical device
industry is amenable to a patent reform system that seeks to balance ethical
and economic considerations better than the current regime. A combined
system is proposed, whereby medical device inventors would be granted
patents offering a reduced period of exclusive control over the device,
followed by receipt of reasonable compulsory licensing royalties for the
remainder of the patent's traditional twenty-year term. This scheme would
be supplemented with additional opportunities to receive governmentprovided monetary awards and benefits in exchange for earlier dedication of
the device to the public domain. Additionally, inventors would continue to
have the option of choosing trade secret protection in lieu of patent rights.
This article concludes that such an arrangement would most equitably
account for the interests and needs of both healthcare device consumers and
producers.
PART I-OVERVIEW OF PATENT LAW
A. GeneralPrinciples
The United States Constitution charges Congress with the responsibility
to promote "the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
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Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.",4 The patent laws deriving from this authority
are generally justified by a utilitarian rationale.5 That is, the government
encourages invention and the dissemination of knowledge by granting
inventors monopolies over their inventions, 6 in exchange for disclosure in
the patent application of the invention's description and best means of
enablement.7 Currently, the monopoly term lasts twenty years from the
filing date of the application. 8
During this period of exclusive control, the patent holder can restrict
others from introducing to the market any product that fits within the
patent's claims. 9
Moreover, the patent owner may charge supracompetitive prices for access to the invention, which allows the inventor to
recoup the research and development costs that competitors would not incur
if permitted to free-ride off her work.1 ° Without this mechanism to recover
fixed costs, inventors would have difficulty earning a profit and would lose
much of their incentive to create." Alternatively, the patent owner may
withhold the invention from the public for the duration of the patent period.
To be eligible for this patent protection, the invention must meet several
statutory conditions.
Under current law, these requirements apply
generally, with no statutory text explicitly dictating differential treatment
for varying types of technology. 12 First, the invention must fit into one of
4. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. See, e.g., Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools,
and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
141, 150-55 (2004) (describing the incentive to invest, incentive to disclose, and incentive to
innovate theories for providing patent protection to promote scientific progress). See also
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1966) (noting that the Framers
rejected a natural rights theory of intellectual property in favor of a social and economic
rationale for the patent system, since the Framers believed that the monopoly grant was at
odds with the "inherent free nature of disclosed ideas").
6. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring that the application of the invention contain a
description in such "clear, concise, and exact terms" as to allow a "person having ordinary
skill in the art" to construct and use the invention once the patent term is over). 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) (2000) (a "person having ordinary skill in the art" is often referred to as a
"PHOSITA"). See also Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474
(1895) ("The Incandescent Lamp Case").
8. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (providing that anyone who "makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention" without authority, infringes the patent); 35 U.S.C. § 281
(2000) (permitting an inventor "remedy by civil action" for patent infringement); 35 U.S.C.
§ 283 (2000) (providing the courts authority to grant injunctions for patent infringement).
10. See Mireles, supra note 5, at 151-52.
11. Id. at 152.
12. Some authors have suggested that Patent Office examiners and courts may be
holding different categories of inventions to different standards on their own, without
express authorization from Congress. See infra notes 93-100. This article also considers
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the general categories of patentable matter, which includes any "new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof."' 13 Congress intended the patent laws to
have a wide scope; 14 thus, while natural phenomena and abstract ideas are
not patentable, the medical devices under consideration in this article would
clearly fall within the bounds of the law. The second requirement is
utility, 15 which in practice is a minimal constraint. The medical devices at
issue here are presumed useful, insofar as they perform the functions they
are designed to perform and provide at least a minimal social benefit.
The third requirement of novelty reflects the principle that only new
inventions merit patent protection.' 6 Still, an improvement on an invention
covered by a preexisting patent may itself be patented, implicating the
doctrine of blocking patents. 17 In these circumstances, the holder of the
improvement patent and the original patentee each has the right to exclude
the other from practicing the improvement. 18 Of course, the parties may be
able to negotiate licensing agreements so that the innovation reaches the
general public. 19 However, if the bargaining process breaks down, the
improvement will be kept from the market until the original patent's term
expires and the invention enters the public domain. 20 This article will
explore the implications of blocking patents as they relate to the availability
of medical technologies.
Finally, under the requirement of nonobviousness, the invention must be a sufficient advancement over all
relevant prior art references such that it would not have been obvious to a
person having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSITA") at the time the
invention was made.2'
This article examines the complexities of the economic theories
underlying the current system of patent law, as well as criticisms of these
theories, especially in the context of the medical sector. Essentially, the
current patent system is justified under utilitarian economic theory as a
means of providing incentives for the creation of information when the
development and dissemination of knowledge is valuable to society but not
how the patent statute offers special treatment to certain categories of medical technologynamely, medical procedures and drugs-in other aspects of the law. See infra Part I.B.
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
14. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
15.

See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

See also UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK

OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,

2100-20 (2006).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
17. Mireles, supra note 5, at 168.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 169.
20. Id. at 168.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
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necessarily profitable for the originator in the absence of monopoly
pricing.22
Under a patent monopoly, inventors know that their competitors will be
barred from free-riding off of the time and money they invest into
development by merely copying the end result.23 At the same time,
inventors are not constrained by market forces pushing the price of the
innovation down to its marginal costs of production.2 4 Therefore, while a
patent monopoly allows inventors to price goods at a level where they can
recover fixed costs of research and development, nothing prevents them
from raising the price even higher.25 Consequently, a significant population
may value the invention more than its marginal cost but less than its
monopoly price.26 Although these people would benefit from obtaining the
good, the patent monopoly would price them out of the market, ultimately
resulting in net social welfare loss. 27 Moreover, to the extent that the
inventions would have been created even without patent protection, society
suffers a deadweight loss without any countervailing benefit, which
undermines the utilitarian justification for patent protection in the first
place.28 This article argues that this deadweight loss is particularly
dangerous in the medical context, where not only financial interests, but
also public health and welfare, are at stake.
B. Medical Proceduresand Pharmaceuticals
The previous section outlined the general principles of patent law, which
apply to most inventions. However, due to the unique interests implicated
in medical procedures and prescription drugs, Congress has deviated from
the strict universal application of these principles by enacting special rules
22. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property
Rights: Justificationsand Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to GenerateInformation,
and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 301, 303-04 (1998).

23.
24.

See id. at 303.
Id.

25.

See id.

26. Id.
27. Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 304-05.
28. The term "deadweight loss" in economics generally refers to the loss of efficiency (a
deviation from the optimal market equilibrium) that occurs as the result of market distortions
like taxes, subsidies, or monopoly pricing. See, e.g., KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 442 (Prentice Hall 5th ed. 1999) (1994). In the context of the
patent monopoly, society accepts a loss of competition because the promise of the monopoly
will induce inventors to create. Thus, it logically follows that if an inventor would have
created the invention even without the patent promise, no new value is added to society that
would not have arisen anyway. In this sense, whenever an invention would have been
created regardless of patent protection, the utilitarian justification for the current patent
regime fails.
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and exceptions in these areas. Since medical devices implicate many of
these same interests, this section offers a brief overview of some of the
more important departures from the general patent regime for health-related
inventions.
Indeed, the comparison of medical devices to medical
procedures and drugs was recognized as appropriate in the past, as patent
experts have testified before Congress that "patenting medical devices
raises virtually all the same social costs as does patenting medical
methods. ' 9
For one, pharmaceuticals receive special treatment under patent law with
respect to the length of the monopoly term. Instead of the standard twenty
year term that begins on the date the application was filed for utility and
plant patents, the duration for drug patents is calculated on the basis of the
time it takes for clinical trials and FDA approval. 30 Notwithstanding this
"advantage," the "effective patent life" of the average drug patent is only
11.8 years. 3' Yet, the pharmaceutical industry is often cited as being
particularly reliant on patent protection due to its substantial upfront
research and development expenditures.32 The fact that the industry
"maintains tremendous incentive to innovate despite having patent duration
effectively shortened by approximately one-third. . . [provides] strong
reason to believe that the incentive provided by the patent system may be
much more than is necessary for this or other industries. 3 3 To be sure, this
article supports the same contention, and argues that a reduced patent term
may be justified for medical devices as well.
Further, granting differential treatment to medical devices is not
unprecedented in patent law for the medical sector. For example, Congress
enacted a statutory exception for the manufacture, use, or sale of patented
inventions "for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under Federal law which regulates" drugs in order to protect
certain medical researchers from liability. 34 Specifically, experimental uses
of a patented drug will not constitute infringement if undertaken for the
purpose of obtaining FDA approval to get a safe generic version of the
product to the market shortly after the patent term expires. 35 While the text
29. Medical ProceduresInnovation andAffordability Act and Inventor ProtectionAct of
1995: Hearingon H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 81 (1995) (statement of Donald R.
Dunner, Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American Bar Association).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). See also Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating
PatentLifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 290 (2006).
31. Johnson, supra note 30, at 290.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e)(1) (2007).
35. Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure
Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 112
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of the law only explicitly mentions drugs, the Supreme Court
has construed
36
this statutory exception to apply to medical devices as well.

Additionally, Congress has attempted to balance competing interests in
the context of medical procedure patents. The medical community has
consistently opposed patent protection in this area, while other interest
groups have objected to limitations either specifically on patents in the
medical context or on patentable subject matter generally. 37 This conflict
led to an amendment to the patent statute prohibiting suit against a medical
practitioner or related healthcare entity for performance of a patented
medical activity.38
However, several exceptions written into this amendment demonstrate
why an amendment alone is insufficient to address all the concerns raised
within this article. For instance, an exempted "medical activity" does not
39
include "the use of a patented machine . . .in violation of such patent.,
Thus, physicians are prevented from using another device in a medical
procedure if doing so would constitute an infringement of that patent.4 °
Furthermore, the statutory exception does not extend explicitly to persons
involved in activities directly related to "the commercial development,
manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution" of a medical device. 41 As a
result, it grants a continuing legal remedy to device manufacturers against
other persons or entities that infringe or induce others to 42infringe upon
medical procedure patents by offering competing technology.
In the aggregate, these special rules indicate that Congress is receptive to
amending patent law to meet the distinctive needs of the health industry. It
is unlikely, however, that Congress will completely abandon the
fundamental precepts of patent law discussed in Section A, even when the
social interests at issue are substantial. Therefore, it is necessary to
examine the considerations associated with the implementation of an
alternative system that can build on the patent regime currently in place.

(1996) (describing this exception as congressional action to "diminish rights of patent
holders that conflict with the public interest").
36. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678-79 (1990). See generally
Shashank Upadhye, Understanding Patent Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e): The
Collisions Between Patent,Medical Device, and Drug Laws, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2000).

37. Portman, supra note 35, at 113 n.99.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
40. Portman, supra note 35, at 114-15. See also Frank M. Washko, Should Ethics Play
a Special Role in PatentLaw?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1030 (2006).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(3) (2000).
42. Portman, supra note 35, at 117.
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PART II-ETHICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
AFFECTING PATENT LAW

In overseeing the future direction of patent law, legislatures must balance
the ethical and economic policy concerns implicated by it. Unfortunately,
these concerns often conflict not only with each other, but internally as
well, with respect to the preferable course of action they suggest. Sections
A and B of this Part respectively explore the major ethical and economic
considerations implicated in shifting to an alternative intellectual property
regime for medical devices. Thereafter, although a full survey of applicable
international patent law is beyond the scope of this article, Section C
provides an overview of how adherence to the most prominent intellectual
property law treaty-the World Trade Organization TRIPS agreementcould limit the United States' ability to undertake drastically transformative
measures.
A. Ethical Considerations
The ethical principles underlying the U.S. patent system are widely
recognized to be utilitarian.43 Thus, in considering the moral implications
of altering the intellectual property regime governing medical devices, this
article sets aside any qualms one might have about denying an inventor
some Lockean conception of her "natural rights" in her creation.44 Instead,
this article focuses on striking the appropriate balance between ensuring the
widespread and equitable availability of medical care, and constructing the
optimal environment for cultivating medical advancements.
The
complexity of this challenge is reflected in the shift in the American
Medical Association's ("AMA") position on patenting medical devices over
time: half a century ago, the AMA held that patenting medical instruments,
appliances, and other devices was unethical.45 Today, the prohibition on
such patents no longer stands.46
As noted above,47 the ethical implications of patenting medical
43. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L.
REv. 1575, 1597 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] ("courts and
commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent law is utilitarian: We grant
patents in order to encourage invention.").
44.

See JOHN LOCKE,

Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

287 (Peter Laslett

ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Essentially, Locke's natural rights theory of property
asserts that each individual has an exclusive "property" in her own person, and a
corresponding right to the fruits of the labor of her body. Thus, a natural rights theorist
might argue that patent protection for medical devices is merited by virtue of the laborer's
inventive endeavor alone. Such arguments are outside the scope of this article, however.
45. Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 329, 354 (1997).
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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procedures have been so substantial that Congress enacted special safe
harbor provisions protecting medical practitioners from liability for using a
Indeed, many of these concerns surrounding the
patented method.
patenting of medical procedures translate directly to the medical devices
domain.
To begin, the costs associated with patenting medical products raise a
myriad of ethical concerns. For instance, the prohibitively high licensing or
royalty fees that a patent holder may charge for her product could
substantially impair patient access for the duration of the patent monopoly,
either because few doctors could afford to acquire the relevant technology
or because the individual patients could be priced out of the market. 4 8 Also,
costs to the healthcare system could rise as teaching hospitals and medical
schools that use these patent-protected products could potentially pass the
expense of the monopoly prices on to their medical students in the form of
higher tuition fees. 4 9 This ethical argument can be expressed in an
economic framework: even though property rights may create additional
incentives to innovate, a social order where these innovations are not
widely available may generate lower net social welfare than a system where
fewer innovations are created, but where innovations are accessible on a
more widespread basis. °
Regarding the ethical implications of an innovation's availability, there is
a danger that a particular device could become the preferred form of
treatment for a specific ailment, such that it would define the standard of
carei 1 This kind of standardization could force doctors who treat that
ailment to pay whatever price the patentee sets in order to avoid malpractice
liability. 2 An atmosphere where medical decisions are heavily influenced,
if not dictated, by monetary affairs, stands in contradiction to the "rather
uniformly recognized . . . patients' rights to receive medical care in
accordance with their licensed physician's best judgment and the
physician's right to administer it .... ,3 Thus, current patent law has the
48. Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner "Process" Infringer:
Greasingthe Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 51,
62 (1999) (discussing a similar effect for patented medical procedures).
49. Portman, supra note 35, at 107.
50. Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 6 (1991).
51. Havins, supra note 48, at 62-63.
52. Id. Havins foresees, at least in the context of medical processes, a situation where
doctors are trapped: if they refuse or are unable to purchase the right to perform the relevant
procedure (or, by analogy, to buy the relevant device), they risk liability for breach of the
duty of care; but if they perform the procedure anyway, they open themselves to
infringement suits. Id.
53. United States v. Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (M.D. Ala. 1978). See also
Portman, supra note 35, at 109 ("The physician must decide whether to become a licensee,
refer the patient to a licensee, . . . or forgo the procedure [or use of the device]
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potential to distort not only the patient's choice of physician, but the
physician's choice of treatment.
In addition to limiting treatment options, there is concern that the
existence of patent rewards is changing the ethics and dynamics of the
medical research field.54 The unique characteristics of this sector, which
make it particularly amenable to elimination or alteration of the current
patent system, are discussed in greater detail below. 55 Briefly, however,
industry insiders have recognized that the means by which patent law
allocates credit and potential monetary reward for invention has caused
distrust between students and faculty members, altering the traditional
mentorship relationship in a way that threatens the progress of science and
the useful arts.56
Clearly, there are ethical consequences to current patent law that, in the
aggregate, suggest that adjustments to the regime could lead to a net
increase in social welfare. That is, the financial losses that some industry
players may face could be relatively minor and will arguably be outweighed
by the improvements in the rapport between researchers and the wider
availability of medical devices, both of which benefit society as a whole.
Accordingly, it is important to weigh these ethical implications when
considering alternatives to the existing patent regime.
B. Economic Considerations
As previously stated, the Constitutional underpinnings of the U.S. patent
system are found in the Intellectual Property clause, which provides that
government-conferred exclusive rights are permissible for the purposes of
promoting science and the useful arts.57 If the ultimate goal of the patent
system is to benefit society, then arguably the current patent system focuses
too heavily on providing economic incentives for creation at the expense of
progress in the open exchange of knowledge and public access to medical
advancements. In other words, there may be an unintended tradeoff
whereby the patent system has increased the total quantity of inventions
while neglecting the importance of quality and accessibility, by means of
the patent monopoly and the "race to be first." Merely spurring the flow of

altogether .... The patent has directly interfered with the physician's decision-making
process, the patient's treatment, and the patient's choice of medical provider.").
54. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability:Natural
Productsand Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 174 (2001).
55. See infra Part IV.B.
56. See Golden, supra note 54, at 174 (reviewing reports of increasing "pathological
behavior" among scientists, attributable to the influence of the patent regime and resulting in
disrupted mentor-mentee relationships and slowed production of knowledge).
57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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private investment dollars into technological endeavors is not, after all, the
objective of the Intellectual Property clause. 8
The danger of the patent monopoly implemented in the current patent
regime is that it may grant "property rights beyond what inventors legally
deserve, or (of more fundamental concern) beyond what best promotes the
development and dissemination of technological products." 59 Because
industry lobbyists generally believe that increased intellectual property
protection will increase profits, lobbyists push for ever broader patent
protection.
Thus, arguably the patent institution distorts behavior from
what is constitutionally desirable and economically efficient. On the other
hand, some scholars have contended that the U.S. is a leader in research and
innovation because of the broad scope of the protection its patent system
offers. 6'
Regardless of whether medical research has flourished because of or in
spite of the current patent system, the system's structure leaves it vulnerable
to abuse. While manipulation of the patent laws for personal gain leads to
inefficiencies and social losses in all categories of inventions, it is
particularly detrimental in the medical context because of the negative
effects it can have on patient care. For example, a patent holding company
or other business entity can purchase the patent rights of struggling or
bankrupt companies, even if it lacks the ability or intention to use, improve,
or develop the technology it purchases. 62 Instead, the new patent-holder can
use its property right to extract funds from those who do wish to put the
knowledge underlying the patent to a socially beneficial or commercial
use.63 If the patent owner's demands are too high, innovation will hit a
roadblock: businesses will abandon the project, diverting funding from
potentially valuable research endeavors, or pass the expense along to
healthcare consumers for whom increases in marginal costs are difficult to
absorb.
Although the problem of the "race to be first" permeates patent law
generally, certain effects of this phenomenon are specific to the medical
context. Priority races occur because only the first firm to invent the
58. See Golden, supra note 54, at 104-05 (arguing that patents are intended to provide
protection that gives innovators an incentive "to bring forth new knowledge").
59. Id. at 105.
60. Id. at 133.
61. See, e.g., Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in
the United States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 223, 241 (2002) (comparing U.S. advancement over other nations in
the field of biotechnology).
62. Washko, supra note 40, at 1032.
63. Id. The same logic would also allow patent holding companies to hinder the ability
of companies who wanted to make products for socially beneficial, rather than purely
economic, reasons.
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relevant device will obtain a patent right in it, notwithstanding other firms'
investments in developing similar products that fall within the patent's
claims. 64 As a result, both the device and the scientific knowledge
underlying it evolve at sub-optimal levels.65
Despite this problem, Professor Kitch's prospect theory of intellectual
property suggests that it is most sensible to grant the original patentee broad
ability to control the development, manufacture, and sale of her invention,
since the expertise she acquired in creating the invention put her in a
superior position to encourage further use and improvements.66 Then again,
it is equally likely that under these circumstances both the patent holder and
other potential inventors have a reduced interest in producing a more
socially useful form of the invention. 67 The patent owner can continue to
charge monopoly prices on the original invention without pursuing
additional improvements that would actually merit higher prices. The
owner can also block future inventors from practicing their improvements
on the original device until the original patent term is over.68 In the rapidly
changing field of medical technology, both the original invention and the
improvement may be obsolete by that time.
In their general critique of Kitch's prospect theory, Professors Merges
and Nelson elaborate on these concerns and conclude that rivalrous
development is superior to coordinated development both theoretically and
empirically. 69 First, they argue that rivalry sharpens the threatened
consequences of passivity. 7 0 In support of this contention, they discuss
several occasions where firms with control over a technology were
complacent with the status quo until competition drove them to embark on
new socially beneficial and profitable ventures. 71 Additionally, they claim
that the prospect theory overlooks the fact that a firm may focus on the one
or few aspects or applications of the protected technology with which it is
most familiar, even though outsiders may find other potential functions for
the device.72 Professors Merges and Nelson contend that it is reasonable to
expect that a broad property right will lead to underdevelopment and lost

64.

Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 329.

65.

Id.

66.

See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &

ECON. 265 (1977).
67. Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 329-30.
68. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX L. REv. 989, 1010 (discussing the problem of blocking patents).
69. See generally Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
PatentScope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990).
70. See id. at 872.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 873.
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improvements that otherwise would have occurred if a diverse set of
researchers had access to the device.73
In sum, there are both economic advantages and disadvantages to the
existing U.S. patent regime. While this Section described some of the
inadequacies that an alternative system should address, patent law
reformists must continually reflect on potential distortions a different
regime could cause.
C. InternationalConsiderations:The TRIPS Agreement
The current patent system is hindered by companies' obligation to
comply with international treaty commitments and the need to keep
American companies competitive in a globalized marketplace. However,
with respect to at least some of the options discussed in this article, these
obstacles are not insurmountable.
The most important treaty to this discussion is Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), the provisions of which the United
States adopted as part of the 1994 Uruguay Round of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") negotiations. 7 4 This agreement generally provides
that patent protection must be available for twenty or more years for all
categories of inventions, unless commercial exploitation of the product
contravenes public order or morality. 75 It is unclear, however, if the ethical

arguments propounded by this article could ever satisfy the WTO's
intended meaning of "morality" sufficient to place medical devices within
this exemption.
Regardless of the breadth of the WTO's interpretation of this provision,
signatory countries have already demonstrated their ability to work within
the general rules of the treaty to deal with related issues, such as ensuring
that citizens of impoverished member nations have access to
pharmaceuticals without materially diminishing the patent-provided
incentive to create them. Indeed, at the Doha Ministerial Conference in
2001, WTO ministers issued a special declaration stating that the terms of
TRIPS should not inhibit member nations from pursuing their domestic
public health policies and goals.7 6 They also encouraged members to take
advantage of flexibilities already written into the TRIPS agreement.7 7
Additionally, the WTO ministers added or extended exemptions and

73.

Id. at 873-74.

74.

See

INFORMATION AND MEDIA RELATIONS DIVISION, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 41 (3d ed. 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/

thewtoe/whatise/tif e/understanding__e.pdf.
75. Id. at 43.
76. Id. at 82.
77. Id.
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waivers designed to facilitate the least-developed countries' ability to
acquire patented drugs more cheaply.78 If necessary, member nations could
agree to similarly special treatment for medical devices.
The safeguard provisions in TRIPS already allow some version of a
compulsory license scheme,79 which is presented in this article as one of the
more favorable alternatives to current patent law. Essentially, compulsory
licensing schemes attempt to influence the terms of bargaining agreements
reached by the original inventor and the improver. 80 Accordingly, TRIPS
does not restrict the reasons for which a government may grant a
compulsory license, provided that the potential licensee first tries to
negotiate a voluntary license from the patent holder. 8 If negotiations fail,
the government can compensate the patent holder for the license at a fair
market rate.82 Depending on the structure of revisions to U.S. patent law,
and barring any conflict with other treaties (such as NAFTA), the need to
craft amendments to TRIPS in order to harmonize international law with a
domestic compulsory licensing regime would be minimal.
Already, a number of foreign countries have implemented compulsory
"dependency license" provisions into their patent statutes. 83 An improver
may invoke these provisions against the dominant patent holder in the case
of blocking patents.84 The existence of these compulsory licenses generally
serves only to facilitate private bargaining for cross-licensing arrangements,
and does not materially alter inventor incentives. 85 This idea suggests that
an appropriately constructed and limited compulsory licensing regime in the
United States would impact incentives minimally and avoid violating any
international reciprocity obligations.
Later, this article explores several options aside from compulsory
78. Id. at 84.
79. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 333 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS

Agreement] (Article 31, "Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder").
80. Robert Merges, Intellectual PropertyRights and BargainingBreakdown: The Case
of Blocking Patents,62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 103-04 (1994).
81. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 79, at 333 (Article 3 1(b)).
Gumisai Mutume, Health and "Intellectual Property", 15 AFRICA RECOVERY, 14,
See also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRIPS AND HEALTH:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS-COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND
82.

14-15 (June 2001).

TRIPS, Sept. 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/public-health-faq-e.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
83. See Merges, supra note 80, at 104-05 (noting that China, France, Italy, Japan, and
Sweden are among countries with compulsory license provisions in their patent statutes).
The European Union, moreover, recently implemented regulations allowing compulsory
licenses in the narrow context of pharmaceuticals exported to least developed nations. See
also Commission Regulation 816/06, 2006 O.J. (157) 1.
84. Id. at 104.
85. Id. at 105.
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licenses, although only tangential consideration is dedicated to the
implementation of these alternatives from an international perspective. As
opposed to these alternatives, however, a compulsory licensing regime
emerges as a promising alternative to the current patent institution, given
the normative and legal background described in this section.
PART 111-CHALLENGES TO ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION REGIMES FOR

MEDICAL DEVICES

The dynamics of the present patent system are ingrained in the nation's
inventive culture; one could expect resistance to change due to the force of
historical precedent alone. Consequently, advocating changes only to the
medical device sector alleviates some political barriers but intensifies
others. Sections A and B of this Part examine how to justify differential
treatment for medical device patents and how to determine what inventions
would fall within the exception's domain. Section C surveys the broader
claim that a selective alternative compensation regime could skew inventor
and investor incentives in the medical device industry in an undesirable
way.
A. Classifying "Medical Devices"
One of the first hurdles to implementing a special category of patent
protection for medical devices is establishing how and when to classify a
given device as "medical." For instance, should the tools used in elective
procedures like cosmetic surgery be released into the public domain before
the traditional patent term has expired, along with the devices used to save
lives or alleviate pain? The ethical pull for universal access to the latter
class of inventions is obviously much stronger, and inventors drawn to
research in the latter category are arguably less likely to be financially
motivated. But what if a plastic surgery device also could be used for
reconstructive purposes? Or what if the technology behind or applications
of an invention could span multiple disciplines? 86 One can foresee
circumstances where firms would argue that their device does not fall
within the medical technology exception and thus deserves the traditional
patent term.
On a related note, the question arises as to who should make the
determination of whether the medical device classification applies. The
average judge likely lacks the appropriate technical background to make
fine distinctions in close cases, but leaving the decision strictly to the U.S.

86. On this question, see, e.g., Qin Shi, Patent System Meets New Sciences: Is the Law
Responsive to Changing Technologies and Industries?, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 317,

336 (2005).
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Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") would further burden the87agency and
leave applicants without the traditional protection of the courts.
B. Singling Out Medical Devices
As this article will illustrate, the medical sector has unique characteristics
that make it particularly amenable to special treatment. As discussed above
in the context of medical procedures and drugs, there is precedent for
congressional action in this area. Nevertheless, the question remains: why
single out medical devices for special treatment, as opposed to any and all
socially valuable inventions? Certainly, representatives of many other
industries also could claim that specially tailored rules would foster
innovation in their respective fields as well. Meanwhile, consumers of their
products could argue that the current law grants an overly expansive award,
or that a reduction in monopoly power is ethically required. As several
scholars note, making distinctions between inventions threatens the
cohesion of the patent system and encourages interest groups to pressure
Congress to change the laws to their advantage.88
Many schemes for redesigning the patent system contemplate
demarcating categories into which inventions would be placed and treated
accordingly. For instance, divisions could be based on economic and
technical traits, such as the invention's cost of production, the income it
generates, or the degree to which it introduces or utilizes pioneering
functions or knowledge. 89 Of course, such information is often difficult to
obtain ex ante. 90 In contrast, categorization based on broad industrial
sectors lacks the precision of a more refined system, but is easier and less
expensive to administer. 91 It also reflects the idea that devices within a
given industry frequently share finer economic and technical traits.92
Determining whether the entire patent system ought to be overhauled and
all inventions segregated into discrete categories is beyond the scope of this
article. For now, it is sufficient to recognize that under virtually any
classification system, medical devices considered en bloc have
characteristics sufficiently unique to justify affording them differential
treatment.
In fact, many scholars argue that a degree of "technological-specificity"
already exists in the patent system due to the actions of the PTO and the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 336-37.
Golden, supra note 54, at 184.
Johnson, supra note 30, at 299.
Id.
See id. at 299-300.
Id.
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courts, even if Congress does not explicitly authorize it.93 For example,
Professor Wagner distinguishes between "micro-specificity" and "macrospecificity" in the patent system. 94 Micro-specificity is a schema whereby
the legal rules applied to an invention vary depending on particular
technological circumstances, regardless of the broad category of industry in
which the invention lies. 95 Under a system of macro-specificity, on the
other hand, the applicable legal rules are distinct across different industries,
but remain similar for all the technologies within a given industry.9 6
Wagner contends that micro-specificity both positively and normatively
describes and justifies current patent law.97 In support of this contention, he
notes that the PHOSITA standard allows for flexible application of the law
from innovation to innovation. 98 Additionally, he argues that categorization
of inventions on the basis of the general nature of the technology or
industry participants is too imprecise to respond to changes in specific
technology. 99
In contrast to the micro-specificity approach, scholars such as Professors
Burk and Lemley advocate a patent system characterized by macrospecificity, particularly as a political means of promoting biotechnology
innovation.100 Although the proposals in this article more closely align with
Burk and Lemley, it is important to note that scholars have endorsed
various types of technological specificity which may already be inherent in
the system.
C. Effects on Incentives
Under a utilitarian rationale, sufficient incentives to innovate are central
to encouraging the creation of new and useful inventions. Therefore, when
considering alternative patent systems, it is necessary to examine not only
the typical progression of the inventive process, but also the effects on the
desire to invent in the first place.
According to some patent law scholars and practitioners, the discovery
trajectory of cutting-edge innovations commences with a groundbreaking
discovery that has potentially broad applications, which defines and

93.

See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Is Patent Law TechnologySpecific?]; R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and
Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341 (2003).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Wagner, supra note 93, at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Wagner, supra note 93, at 1347.
Burk & Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, supra note 93, at 1191.
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establishes the new field.' ° ' Then, discoveries within this new field are
refined further and improved incrementally. °2 Simultaneously, other fields
of inquiry progress in a similar manner.' 0 3 Ultimately, these distinct but
related fields intersect, inspiring even more advanced inventions with
greater commercial potential. 0 4 As a result, the patent system arguably
gains efficiency when it displays horizontal consistency between different
industries. 0 5 In effect, "[t]echnology-specific incentives may appear
attractive at first, but as the technology evolves, the incentive specifically
out-of-sync with the discovery process, obviating its
instituted may become
1'0 6
appeal."
incentive
The literature analyzing the "discovery-trajectory" phenomenon
criticizes proposals to adjust factors, such as the length of the patent term,
to increase the number of patents, arguing that it would be "an
Specifically, this literature
unpredictable and wasteful exercise. ' 7
suggests that the importance of "the inventor's own interest in and means
for industrial application, the ripeness of the invention for commercial
exploitation, the profit margin of the relevant market, and the difficulty and
08
competitiveness of the art" render increasing patent incentives imprudent.'
These same factors support this article's proposal that a reduction in patent
protection may be appropriate.
Nonetheless, basic economic theory suggests that, notwithstanding
external conditions that may mitigate the net effect of change, reducing or
otherwise altering the patent term is likely to skew investor and inventor
incentives. 0 9 Thus, the most fundamental objections against reform of the
current patent regime are that changes to the system would negatively
impact the incentive to invest and incentive to disclose.
1. Incentive to Invest
The incentive to invest theory operates on the premise that patent law
fosters private investment in two fundamental ways. First, it promises

101. Shi, supra note 86, at 331.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 332.
104. Id. at331.
105. Id. at 332.
106. Shi, supra note 86, at 332.
107. Id. Shi finds that the correlation between the number of patents issued to an
inventor and the likelihood that he will invent in the future is nonlinear. Id. at 332.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., James Langenfeld, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust: Steps
Toward Striking a Balance, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 91, 97-98 (2001) (explaining that
reduction in intellectual property protection will lead to a corresponding decrease in
incentives to innovate, leading to an eventual loss into net social welfare).
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individual researchers compensation, in the form of being able to set the
market price for the good, as a reward for dedicating their time and money
to developing the invention. Since knowledge and ideas are classic public
goods, inventors who do not have the right to exclude others from
practicing their inventions risk competitors free-riding off of their initial
investments, obtaining the end result without having to incur the costs. 10 A
lack of invention protection leads to a market failure wherein inventors
cannot recover their costs of development and thus have lower incentives to
create in the first place.' Patent protection helps inventors to recoup their
investments by prohibiting copying during the patent term so that the
patentee can raise the device's price at or above a level sufficient to meet
both fixed and marginal costs.' 12 Therefore, if medical products did not
provide patent protection, individuals with high inventive capital would
realize they could maximize their earnings in a field with traditional patent
protection, thus skewing incentives in a manner that encourages inventors
to explore non-medical fields. Of course, this result presupposes that all
non-economic motivations to innovate are held constant between industrial
sectors, which, as the discussion below will show, is an inappropriate
assumption.
Second, patent rights operate as an "intermediate marketable product-a
government-issued currency""' 3 that allows smaller or start-up firms to
attract the private investment they need to develop and market their
innovations. The inventive process is time sensitive, financially risky, and
carries no guarantee of commercial success. Yet, patent rights shift the
risk-reward calculus in favor of investing capital in an enterprise. In the
event the research and development process produces a commercially
valuable medical device, the inventor will be able to exclude competitors
from the market, therefore increasing the likelihood the investors will
realize a return on their principal. The patent rights also can be licensed or
sold in order to recover capital. Without patent law, investors will arguably
signal of value, which could
lose this important government-sponsored
4
divert resources to other industries. 1
2. Incentive to Disclose
The patent application requires disclosure of the best manner in which
the public can construct and use the device once it enters the public

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Mireles, supra note 5, at 151-52.
Id.
Id.
Golden, supra note 54, at 168.
Id. at 169-70.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2008

19

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 17

domain.1 15 Proponents of the current patent system argue that without this
disclosure requirement, creators have no reason to ever share the knowledge
underlying their innovations with the public. Instead, it would be in their
interest to withhold the information-whether by trade secret, contract, or
other protection-possibly indefinitely, in order to maintain their monopoly
position. 16 Under the current law, however, society can build upon the
knowledge contained in the patent to make improvements to existing
inventions and can construct the patented invention
without duplicative
17
experimentation once the patent term is over.'
PART IV-JUSTIFYING DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

While acknowledging the validity of opponents' objections to an
alternative compensation system, this Part delineates a series of responses
and countervailing considerations that arguably offset, limit, or even
eliminate the potential problems related to developing alternative
compensation regimes discussed in Part III.
Section A begins by
addressing the "incentive to invest" and "incentive to disclose" issues
directly and by describing additional factors outside the domain of patent
law that motivate economically productive behavior. Section B then
illustrates how normative conduct within the medical profession suggests
that the promise of patent protection often is of secondary value in
providing incentive for creative behavior. Taken together, the Sections of
this Part make a credible case for instituting alternative intellectual property
treatment for medical devices.
A. Responses to the Economic Arguments
Some authors have noted a lack of reliable empirical data demonstrating
that the patent system advances scientific and technological knowledge and
innovation in the way economic theory suggests it should. 1 8 Others have
taken the criticism a step further, claiming that patents on medical
technology may "actually stifle innovation and dissemination of these
inventions to the public."'' 9 Even the National Institutes of Health has
cautioned that "intellectual property restrictions can stifle the broad
dissemination of new discoveries and limit future avenues of research and

115. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
116. See Havins, supra note 48, at 62 (explaining the incentive to disclose theory in the
context of medical process patents, and criticizing it on the grounds that, in the absence of
patent protection, another practitioner would be likely to develop the same procedure
anyway).
117. Mireles, supra note 5, at 153-54.
118. See, e.g., Havins, supra note 48, at 61.
119. Washko, supra note 40, at 1027.
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product development."' 12 Indeed, it is generally recognized that different
industries rely on patents to varying extents, suggesting that the rigid patent
term under the current patent law can lead to deadweight monopoly loss
without offsetting innovative gain. This is especially likely where, as with
the medical device sector, the invention would have been created
anyway.121
1. Incentive to Invest

In response to the "incentive to invest" argument that patent rights allow
small businesses to attract the private investment they need to develop their
innovations, Golden's criticisms of this theory in the biotechnology context
apply to the medical device industry as well. For instance, Golden contends
that biotechnology stocks are subject to wild, short-term swings regardless
of their patent position.1 22 This volatility casts into doubt the effectiveness
of patents in stabilizing investments. 23 Likewise, even if stocks in medical
device companies are not as prone to speculative high-risk buying and
selling as biotech stocks, their prices nevertheless fluctuate due to investor
over-enthusiasm and fear, misinformation and misunderstandings about the
company's activities, or announcements unrelated to the company's patent
holdings. 24 Golden summarizes some additional flaws in the "incentive to
invest" rationale as follows:
The stimulation of fights over intellectual property rights-such as
through patent litigation that distracts from, and increases the cost of, the
pursuit and development of innovations-could slow progress more than
the spur of prospective patent speeds it. Furthermore, the erosion or
corruption of public sector values, as a result of increased focus on
obtaining private property rights, could weaken an established and
effective (and predominately publicly funded) system for producing
scientific and technological advance. Finally, patent monopolies could
distort the direction of research and eventually clog the 'small company'
120. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg.
72090 (proposed May 25, 1999).
121. Johnson, supra note 30, at 284-85 (suggesting that a patent system which provides
incentives beyond the inducement threshold can lead to abuses such as the strategic delaying
of competition) (citing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An EmpiricalStudy, 32:2
MGMT. SCl. 173, 174-76 (1986)).
122. Golden, supra note 54, at 170-71.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Amy Tsao, The Healthiest Play in Medical Devices, BUSINESSWEEK,
June 18, 2004, avaliable at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2004/
nf20040618 5362_dbO4.htm?chan=search (describing sector analysts' cautious approach
of investing for the long-term in entities with multi-year histories of profits as opposed to
smaller companies that may experience rapid short-term growth).
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dynamism of the ... industry itself, leading ultimately to its domination
by giant companies with large concentration of vested intellectual
property rights .... 125
As applied to medical devices, reduced patent litigation should translate to
more investment money dedicated to research and development, cheaper
prices for consumers, and a reaffirmation of the communal values discussed
in Section B of this Part. These results could even inspire further public
and private expenditures when investors witness the success of the
traditional knowledge-sharing dynamic at work.
2. Incentive to Disclose
With respect to the argument that the patent application provides
"incentive to disclose," it is important to recognize that although the
information contained in the application will eventually reach the public
domain, the process of filing the application distorts the researcher's
incentive to submit relevant findings for peer review. 126 A statutory bar
precluding the issuance of a patent for public disclosures made more than
one year prior to filing, in combination with possible fear that other experts'
scrutiny could expose flaws in the work, may prompt the patent applicant to
27
limit disclosure and evaluation of the innovation to the patent examiner.
Of course, medical devices will be evaluated for safety before entering the
market. However, the secrecy that permeates the invention immediately
prior to filing the application postpones effective peer review and limits the
forcefulness of the "incentive to disclose" theory.
Furthermore, while the medical technology industry and research
universities frequently work together to develop innovations, members of
the academic community have criticized the tendency of businesses to
privatize information. 128 This privatization has stifled the free exchange of
knowledge that previously characterized academia and facilitated
progress. 129 Indeed, these fears are not purely speculative, as universities,
due at least in part to the influence of the industry, are taking advantage of
the patent system 0 and pursuing licensing and technology transfer schemes
13
more frequently.
125.
article.
126.

127.
128.

Golden, supra note 54, at 172. These flaws apply equally to the concerns of this
Portman, supra note 35, at 106.

Id.
Golden, supra note 54, at 134 (explaining the conflict in the context of the

biotechnology industry).

129. Id.
130. Id. at 142-43 (noting, however, that "even after obtaining the rights to exclusive patent
monopolies, government laboratories and universities have favored widespread granting of nonexclusive licenses," suggesting a concern for the public interest still drives much of this research).
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Studies within the biotechnology sector suggest that the intrusion upon
the traditional expectations of information sharing could have a
demoralizing effect on researchers. 131 The behavior of researchers outside
the bounds of patent law suggests that the "incentive to disclose" is weak
justification for a robust patent system. 32 This rationale demonstrating the
shortcomings of the "incentive to disclose" theory should apply to the
patenting of medical devices as well, since these devices originate with
researchers who possess similar social and academic concerns.
Moreover, even though the knowledge behind the issued patent enters
the public domain, the ability to put that knowledge to any socially or
commercially useful purpose is limited during the term of the patent
monopoly.133 This limitation undermines the "incentive to disclose"
rationale as well. Furthermore, the law prohibits firms from manufacturing
devices that read onto the patent's claims. 134 Thus, inventors could
withhold any improvements on the original invention from the market if the
35
blocking patent holders are unable to negotiate a licensing arrangement.'
Indeed, for minor improvements that would be socially useful but which
would not merit independent patent protection, the information might never
be known.
Arrow's information paradox predicts that the original patent owner will
not be able to price an improver's idea unless the owner first hears of the
improvement.136 However, once the improver discloses the unpatented
improvement information, the original owner is free to use it without
payment. 37 Enterprising companies may also engage in attempts to design
around the patent's claims, generating an invention that serves substantially
the same purpose as the original and wasting investment dollars that could

131. See id. at 152-63 (discussing the motivations of life science professionals).
132. See id. at 165-66 (noting that researchers publish their discoveries for reasons other
than patent protection).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (granting the patent holder the power to exclude others
from making or using the patented invention during the patent term).
134. Id.
135. Lemley, supra note 68, at 1050-51 (describing the "rather absolute power" the
inventor has to control any improvement to her invention during the term of her patent).
136. Id. at 1051. Kenneth Arrow, currently at Stanford University, won the 1972 Nobel
Prize in Economics and the 2004 National Medicine of Science for his extensive
contributions to the field. His work has centered on social choice, risk-bearing, and
decision-making under imperfect information conditions; his "information paradox" is
foundational to theories of the economics of information. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Nat'l Bureau of

Econ. Research ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1962).
137. Id.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2008

23

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 17

be put to a more socially useful purpose. 13 8 Thus, there are several ways in
which the "incentive to disclose" theory is undermined.
3. Additional Factors
Market forces may provide the potential inventor with the anticipation of
income sufficient to incentivize creation, even in the absence of any
government-initiated incentive system or patent.
Perhaps the most
important of the market forces is the "first mover advantage." Scholars
have identified several ways in which the first mover advantage can
manifest itself, potentially rendering patent protection unnecessary.
First, there will often be natural barriers to entry into a particular market,
in addition to those that the originating companies can erect within the
bounds of the law. 139 Second, the original inventor's control over the
market without patent protection will be extended during the period in
which potential copiers learn about the existence of the new device and
consider manufacturing a competing version. 40 Third, once the competitor
makes the decision to manufacture the product, it must complete the
substantial tasks of analyzing and reverse engineering the device,
purchasing the equipment needed to construct it, and hiring or training
engineers familiar enough with the relevant technology to guide this
process. 141
Scholars note that the first mover advantage is most robust when the
relevant industry is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal
costs of production. 142 Indeed, the medical device industry exhibits such
characteristics, 43 suggesting that even in the absence of patent protection,
the prospect of first mover advantages would propel innovation. Even
proponents of reducing or eliminating the current patent system
acknowledge that when deciding whether to undertake a certain project,
138.

Mireles, supra note 5, at 153.

139.

Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 319 (citing F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 384-87 (Rand McNally & Co. 1973) and JEAN
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 400-01 (MIT Press 1988)).
140. See id. at 319-20 (citing F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 385 (Rand McNally & Co. 1973)).
141. See id. at 320 (citing F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 385 (Rand McNally & Co. 1973) and JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 400 (MIT Press 1988)).

142. Id. at 320-21 (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW,
Instructor's Guide § 7, at 5 (2004)).
143. See, e.g., National Innovation Centre, Innovation Know-How Guide to Production
and Distribution In-Use, http://www.nic.nhs.uk/InnovationKnowHow/InnovationAssistant/
Tracks/Productionln-Use/Maintaining+Supplyhtm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) ("Often
medical device production carries high fixed costs partly due to strict regulatory and quality
requirements. This means that a key challenge is to increase the sales and therefore
production volumes to offset these high initial costs and create a sustainable business.").

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol17/iss1/7

24

Nugent: Patenting Medical Devices: The Economic Implications of Ethically

2008]

Patenting Medical Devices

firms will factor into their calculation the probability that copying rivals
44
will appropriate their expenditures on research and development.1
However, the strong possibility of first mover advantages weighs in favor
of pursuing innovation.
The patent system encourages a race-to-invent mentality in which the
"winner" obtains exclusive rights to sell the good for the duration of the
patent term.1 45 The "winner's" competitors receive nothing, regardless of
the extent of their research or how close they came to making the same
patentable invention. However, an approach based on market forces alone
could allow these competitors to realize the benefit of their investments.
For instance, innovation leaders will have a head start over market
newcomers who will be building from scratch and will have to dedicate
time and money to acquiring the machinery, personnel, and knowledge
necessary to compete.146 This environment encourages the most efficient
trajectory of production. In such an environment, firms have reason to
research and innovate in order to reap the benefits awarded to the original
suppliers in the market, while diminishing the need to rush the process in
order to be absolutely first and win the monopoly. This lack of haste in
research and development should result in higher quality devices.
The first mover advantage is one of the most important responses to the
claim that innovators need patent protection to recover their fixed costs of
production. However, several other business-based phenomena can also
lead to increased profit margins, thus providing incentive for inventive
behavior even absent a regime of legal protection. For instance, if two
firms sell equivalent products, the firm with more efficient management,
better marketing and sales efforts, superior customer service,
and a better
147
reputation is likely to see higher gross revenue and net profit.
This concept applies to the first-mover advantage insofar as first-comers
will have more time to perfect these capacities, and consumers are more
likely to continue to do business with a company they trust. Additionally, a
firm that develops a device internally will have up-to-date manufacturing
capacity, familiarity with the technology to facilitate quicker improvements,
and the "kind of holistic understanding" of the device and its market that a
competitor who merely copies the invention will lack. 148 While such
factors alone may not be sufficient to supplant the entire patent system,
when taken into account along with the other characteristics of the medical
144. See Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 325.
145. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(b) (2000) (holding liable as an infringer anyone who
"without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" or who "actively induces
infringement" any patented invention during the patent term).
146. Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 319.
147. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 277, 279.
148.

See id. at 279.
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device industry discussed below, they solidify the case for lessening current
protections and considering alternative forms of compensation.
B. Characteristicsof the Industry
Both globally and historically, the medical profession has disfavored
attempts by its members to hinder the dissemination of knowledge or
discoveries that could benefit patient well-being, particularly when the
motivation is personal financial gain. 149 Of course, this stance is in conflict
with the business segment of the medical device industry, which is more
profit-oriented. 150
Indeed, the AMA deems the open exchange of
information and the publication of research results to be an obligation and
an ethical duty:
This tradition enhances patient care, leads to the early evaluation of new
technologies, and permits the rapid dissemination of improved
techniques ....Prompt presentation before scientific organizations and
timely publication of clinical and laboratory research in scientific
journals are essential elements in the foundation of good medical care.151
Scholars and analysts concur with the AMA's assessment, noting that the
norms of openness, cooperation, and collegiality that permeate the scientific
community help overcome the free-rider problem, lead to the earlier
validation of the results of research endeavors, and minimize unnecessarily
52
duplicative studies.1

A public good-oriented structure of the research community
complements the public service values inherent to the medical profession.
Golden describes this as the "inventor class," characterized by "values that
prize the advancement and wide dissemination of scientific and technical
knowledge, and, less altruistically, support a 'credit economy' in which
1 53
personal achievement is tied to status, reputation, and empire building.
Researchers and academics advance their careers by obtaining grants and
awards, beating their peers to discoveries and innovations, and publishing
seminal works. Accordingly, the potential for personal monetary gain
149.
150.
151.

See, e.g., Portman, supra note 35, at 95, 97-98.
See id. at 104.

COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 9.08 (1994).

152. Paul A. David, The Economic Logic of "Open Science" and the Balance between
Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A
Primer,in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 19, 21-22 (Julie M. Esanu and Paul F. Uhlir, eds.,
Nat'l Academic Press 2003) (adding that intellectual property rights, by promoting secrecy
and priority races, can have the opposite effect of postponing research corroboration efforts
and failing to control redundant experimentation).
153. Golden, supra note 54, at 144.
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through patent protection may be less of an inducement for those who
choose to undertake medical device research rather than enter other
industries.154 Since the "combined incentives of ethical duty, professional
recognition, and career advancement have traditionally been enough
incentive for medical research,"'' 55 there should be no material decline in
innovative behavior. This proposition is particularly true when factoring in
the potential of considerable economic windfall that exists even in the
absence of patent protection for major discoveries and creations, as
discussed in Section A above.
PART V-ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SCHEMES

Assuming this article's supposition is correct and the medical device
industry is amenable to accommodating changes in intellectual property
protection and compensation, the next question is what type of alternative
compensation system would best balance the interests of healthcare
consumers, physicians, and the medical device industry.
This Part
investigates five possible avenues for reform: government grants, awards,
and tax breaks; compulsory licenses; shortened patent terms; trade secret
protection; or some combination of the above. Undoubtedly, any of the
proposed solutions would encounter some intense political resistance.
While this article takes the political feasibility of enactment into account,
this factor is not determinative in the way it might prove to be in practical
application.
A. Government Grants,Awards, and Tax Breaks
In theory, replacing patent protection with a government reward system
could remedy many of the current regime's shortcomings. A properly
designed reward system would offer financial stimulus to innovate, similar
to the stated purpose of the patent monopoly, but without the corresponding
restrictions on the use and dissemination of what is created. 56 Under this
regime, the government would pay inventors a monetary award that reflects
the value society assigns to the product and the reasonable investments in
developing it. 157 In return, the invention and related information would
enter the public domain, obtainable by anyone at the marginal cost of
production or dissemination. 58
Because inventors would receive

154. See id. at 144-45. Golden believes that because of the lack of material rewards
during the early parts of their careers, these scientists' claims to be motivated by the desire
cure or treat disease and advance scientific knowledge are plausible. Id. at 154.
155. Washko, supra note 40, at 1030-31.
156. Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 306-07.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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appropriate compensation and the availability of the device would approach
its socially optimal
level, net social welfare could be improved over the
59
1
system.
current
Furthermore, a reward system could help to solve some of the negative
consequences of the "race to be first" problem discussed above. For
instance, even if a company did not receive a government reward for
creating the foundational invention, it could utilize the technology to make
further improvements that would both benefit society and make the
company eligible for new government rewards or superior position in the
marketplace. As a corollary matter, if the firm had already sunk costs into
trying to develop the original invention, only to have another company win
the award first, those investments would still give the firm a competitive
advantage over others and would allow the resources to be reapplied to the
pursuit of the improvements.
While a government reward system has appeal in the abstract, it suffers
from many practical problems that would likely render it unfeasible.160 The
most obvious impracticality is the difficulty of calculating the appropriate
amount of money with which to reward each inventor.' 61 While proponents
of these plans have argued that an independent commission could tie
valuation to market demand, others have countered that creating a new
government entity would be an unnecessary and additional expense, since it
would lack the specialized familiarity with the relevant markets that
subsists naturally in private businesses. 6 2 There is also the possibility of a
reduced incentive to innovate if the expected returns from the government
award are less than the expected returns from monopoly pricing.
Of course, some inventors might prefer the assured money of a reward
system over the risk that a different cheaper invention will come along and
diminish the market value of the patented product. To further dispel the
concern of under-investment, the government could promise to give
additional compensation to those inventions that unexpectedly exceed the
original projected market value used to calculate the initial award.
However, determining the source of funding for this program is an even
more fundamental problem, assuming that the government could determine
the appropriate amount of money to present to each inventor. Although
proponents of a reward system argue that the administrative costs would be
comparable to those of the current patent regime, 63 there is no
comprehensive study of the probable costs of such a transition. Thus, such

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 307-08.
See, e.g., id.
Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 308.
Id.
Id. at 337.
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claims are speculative and should be treated with caution. Furthermore,
while it does seem likely that the increased public access, the decreased
prices for medical devices, and the accelerated technological development
that would come from a properly functioning reward system would offset
any increase in taxes,' 64 it is unclear if the public would perceive it this
way. Rather, any increase in taxes would probably be met with resistance.
Finally, whether tax rates are increased or tax revenue is shifted to the
reward program from other areas, there would be an implicit subsidy
whereby wealthy individuals in good health bear a higher burden of paying
the costs and receive less value from the system than less financially
fortunate individuals in poor health who consume more medical devices
and services. However, this type of subsidization is currently in practicefor example, through Medicare deductions from paychecks and risk pooling
via health insurance plans-so it would not be an impossible endeavor to
arrange tax plans for a medical device program in a similar manner.
In addition to funding problems, the public's desire to see the
government tied up in healthcare policy issues raises another concern.
Society generally has greater faith in the market than the government to
allocate resources efficiently. Critics of government reward systems worry
that such state intervention could inhibit creative independence. 165 While
this may be less problematic in the realm of the sciences than in the arts,
there is still the potential for distortions to arise. For example, when
Congress allocates funds, they may be swayed by powerful interest groups
for particular causes or inclined to disproportionately fund "glamorous" or
"popular" media-friendly projects (such as AIDS or breast cancer research,
for instance), even though other areas of research are less exposed, and
therefore in greater need of funding. Electing a post hoc reward system as
opposed to an ex ante funding mechanism may mitigate the problem
somewhat by allowing researchers to read the market and commence work
in areas they anticipate will be lucrative. Even with this arrangement,
however, problems could arise if a supposedly independent commission
systematically over-valued certain types of medical devices, or if the
method of calculating reward amounts failed to incorporate intensity of
need or preference into a market-based formula.
As an alternative to an award system, government grants have been
proposed. Of course, a discussion of government grants would not be
complete without consideration of the Bayh-Dole Act, which controls part
of the broader legal regime surrounding current patent law. 166 The passage
164. Id. at 337-38.
165. See Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright,
56 AM. EcoN. REv. 421, 425-26 (1966).
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of the Bayh-Dole Act ("Act") allows universities and small firms to hold
patents on inventions developed with federal funds. 167 In doing so, the Act
reflects congressional recognition that the sciences will advance more
168
quickly if business, academia, and government coordinate their actions.
Although the government reserves a non-exclusive right under the Act to
employ an invention developed with government money and can require
licensing if the patent-holder does not practice the invention within a
reasonable time, the institutional beneficiary maintains the rights of a
traditional title owner.1 69 With the resultant additional money to support
expensive technological research, universities are able to engage in projects
that their budgets would not otherwise support and to retain experts in the
applied sciences
fields who might otherwise work in the more lucrative
1 70
private sector.
While the Act may encourage institutional inventors to develop better
commercial applications of their patented articles, by granting these entities
patent monopolies it also results in the same problems of restricted public
access inherent in the patent system generally.1 7' These restrictions seem
particularly unfair given that the public has already paid for the technology
through the initial government grant. 72 Furthermore, blurring the line
between the public sector and private business could have negative
implications for the socially oriented disposition of academia and
government. 73 Thus, to the extent the Bayh-Dole Act conflicts with the
goals of alternative systems discussed in this Part, it quite clearly
contradicts the typical bargain of acceptance of taxpayer money in
exchange for public availability and dissemination of the results, which is
what this article believes gives a reward program its appeal in the first
place. As such, it serves as an example that, like the traditional patent
regime, alternative compensation schemes also must ensure that the
inventor's rewards are proportionate to the sacrifices that society makes to
stimulate the inventions. Because it fails in this respect, the Act should be
repealed.
In addition to government grants and awards, scholars have also
supported tax credits as an alternative way to fund research and

166. See Bayh-Dole (University and Small Business Patent Procedures) Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§
200-212 (2007).
167. Mireles, supra note 5, at 142-43.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 160.
170. Id. at 157.
171. Id. at 147.
172. Mireles, supra note 5, at 143.
173. Id. at 157.
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development indirectly. 7 4 However, ex ante tax credits, like grants and
other forms of government subsidy, tend to exacerbate the difficulty of
determining an appropriate amount to award, because the benefit is given
Nevertheless,
before the developer produces anything tangible.175
government grants and tax subsidies would encourage research and
development efforts for a wider array of innovations by shifting the risk
from the inventor to the government, and by increasing the financial base
for projects whose social value is greater than their projected business
value.' 7 6 By offering the award ex ante, the government is in a position to
require that the output of the government-funded research enter the public
domain. 177
Presently, the government already subsidizes this behavior to a certain
extent, and it is not unrealistic to think this role could be expanded. This
expansion could shift the quid pro quo from one where the government
reward (of a patent monopoly) follows disclosure of the invention, to one
where the government reward (of a subsidy or grant) precedes the creation
of the device, which the inventor is then obligated to make publicly
available. Such a system would deal directly with many of the ethical and
economic concerns discussed in this article.
In performing and funding research, the government (insofar as it
represents its national constituency and acts consistent with its
constitutional charge) seeks primarily to advance the "national interest"
in scientific and technological progress. At the level of the twentybillion-dollar-per-year enterprise known as the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH"), this "national interest" is viewed as consisting of
developing knowledge and technology that is either to be put into the
public domain, or to be entrusted to someone who will use it to produce
articles of public use. Accordingly, the government can be viewed as
seeking to use public funding and patent protection to maximize the
that are either available for
development of knowledge-based products
78
free or freely offered on public markets.'
Although the shortcomings of extreme government intervention may
preclude subsidies, grants, and awards from displacing the patent system
altogether, they could nonetheless prove to be useful tools if applied in
conjunction with other alternatives to the current patent regime.
174. See Golden, supra note 54, at 138 (calling tax credits a "classic example" of how the
government can fulfill its task "to try to mediate the relationship between industry and
academia to optimize scientific and technological progress" in a manner other than direct
funding).
175. Johnson, supra note 30, at 274.
176. Id. at 274-75.
177. Id. at 275.
178. Golden, supra note 54, at 132-33 (footnotes omitted).
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B. Compulsory Licenses
Under the present system, patent rights are enforced by a property rule,
rather than a liability rule. 179 In other words, the patent owner has the right
to completely enjoin an infringer from using the protected invention, which
in turn allows her to set her own price for licenses.' 80 One possible
alternative to the current property rule patent regime is a regime that
employs a liability rule: namely, a compulsory licensing scheme. Under a
liability rule system, courts determine the value of the performance or good
on the basis of objective market criteria, in order to calculate the
compensation that must be paid to the injured party in the event of an
infringement. 18' Generally, compulsory licensing schemes implement a
liability rule in the case of improvement inventions that infringe original
patents. 182
Within these systems, injunction tends to be an appropriate remedy only
when the bargaining environment is conducive to ensuring that the right to
practice the invention ultimately will subsist with the highest-valuing users.
Typically, such circumstances exist when there are a small number of
interested parties who can easily identify each other, transaction costs are
low, and courts would have a difficult time setting a fair price for a
damages 3award due to the complexities of the asset and relevant business
18
context.
Thus, awarding injunctive relief is sound policy only in limited contexts.
The medical device industry, however, seems to lack the characteristics that
would make it appropriate economically or socially. First, although major
firms will have the means and incentives to track down the owners of
patents they wish to license, the medical technology industry is
characterized by a large number of players. This complicates the patent
holder's decision of to whom, when, and at what price to license.
Furthermore, although they are not "interested parties" in the sense of
desiring the right to manufacture the device on their own, patients and
doctors have a legitimate interest in whether the technology is available at
an affordable price. The licensing market, however, fails to recognize this
interest because collective action problems hinder these groups 84from
promoting their needs as effectively as individual yet powerful firms. 1
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Merges, supra note 80, at 77-78.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 78.

184. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (widely considered the

AND

foundational work on the theory of collective action problems). Specifically, the broad
geographical dispersion of patients and doctors as a group makes cohesive organization and
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Second, transaction costs will likely be high in most exchanges, given
the information costs related to the complexity of the medical device
technology involved. These costs include: (1) the chance for opportunistic
and strategic behavior, especially when rights overlap (as in the case of
blocking patents); (2) the expense of policing adherence to the terms of the
agreement and enforcing it through the legal system; and (3) the divergent
and often conflicting motivations of the transacting entities.185
Third, while parties may in good faith differ in their ex ante estimations
of the value of the technology, not to mention their strategic bargaining
postures, an expert-led court should be able to determine a fair
approximation of market value for the medical device. Moreover, in the
context of compulsory licensing, where there were gross discrepancies
between the anticipated and actual value of the invention, the court could
make adjustments ex post. Thus, it appears that rights in medical devices
could be secured by a liability rule as well as, or even superior to, a
property rule.
This idea holds true despite the fact that a basic understanding of Robert
Coase's theorem would suggest that a compulsory licensing system is not
necessary in the patent context. Coase's theorem provides that regardless of
who holds the property right initially, interested parties should be able to
bargain to allow for the most efficient allocation of resources, whether by
trading, transferring, or licensing the rights. 186 Coase himself recognized,
187
however, that this holds true only in the absence of transaction costs.
However, in the biomedical industry context, as indicated immediately
above, such transaction costs generally are presumed to be substantial and
may include any of the following: the existence of bundling rights, strategic
behavior, varying degrees of competence and experience in business and
negotiation, conflicting party motivations (especially where concerns of
financial profit are juxtaposed against those of social welfare improvement),
and differing abilities to handle excess costs. 88 In such conditions, firms
may fail to reach a licensing agreement, even if it would benefit the parties
as well as society.
Fragmented patent rights, leading to patent thickets' 89 and patent anticooperation difficult, while each individual has an incentive to free-ride off the efforts of
others, enjoying the benefits of lower medical device prices without contributing any time or
resources toward attaining them.
185. See generally Jfirg Niehans, Transaction Costs, in 4 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law 677-80 (John Fatwell, et al. eds., 1987). Traditional examples of
transaction costs include the expenditure of resources for obtaining information about a
potential exchange, bargaining to suitable terms, and policing compliance.
186Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,5 (1960).
187. Id. at 7.
188. Mireles, supra note 5, at 173-74.
189. The term "patent thicket" refers to a technological field where the relevant patent rights
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commons, 190 further exacerbate the barriers to successful license
negotiation. The end result is that one or both parties may believe that
transaction costs would overwhelm the net gain from otherwise efficient
licensing arrangements. 19' This belief causes too few potential licensees to
seek the license in the first instance and a shortage of licensors supplying
the demand that does exist. 192 Research suggests that especially high
transaction costs leading to market failure are more likely when the subject
of the license is a major innovation, and when the licensor modifies the
license for each individual licensee. 193 In these circumstances, "it is much
simpler to grant roughly identical licenses to all who will pay a standard
1 94

rate."

Another concern is that a compulsory license scheme allows the court or
a third-party agency to fix the terms of the agreement, rather than allowing
the parties to do so themselves. The parties to the transaction may be more
likely than courts to accurately appraise the device at issue because with
new technology, the parties' subjective perception of the asset's potential
for success in the marketplace can overshadow the more objective measures
a court would use in making value judgments.' 95 To the extent that the
parties' familiarity with the technology and expertise about industry needs
gives them a comparative advantage over courts in pricing devices, such
subjectivity is desirable.
As noted previously, however, the parties' subjective valuation of the
device can be detrimental to achieving compromise when one or both
misestimate the technology's worth. This could be a good faith error, part
of a bargaining strategy, or a combination of both. 196 However, a court or
agency using indicators such as the item's fixed and marginal costs of
are owned by multiple actors, leading to coordination problems when trying to assemble the
necessary rights to conduct further research. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.
(OECD), GENETIC INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES
15 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf.
190. The "tragedy of the anti-commons" occurs when too many people hold private rights in
a particular property, with each able to block the others' use such that the property as a
whole is underutilized. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
191
Lemley, supra note 68, at 1054-55.
192. Id.

193.

Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 874 (citing D.

TEECE, THE MULTINATIONAL

44
(Ballinger Publishing Co. 1976) (finding that transfer costs constitute nearly one fifth of the
total project costs in the international transactions studied)).
194. Id. at 874-75.
195. Merges, supra note 80, at 99-100.
196. Lemley, supra note 68, at 1058-59. See also Merges, supra note 80, at 89-90. Merges
acknowledges these obstacles to efficient bargaining but believes they are most problematic
in the context of blocking patents, where he argues application of the doctrine of reverse
equivalents would be a superior solution. Id. at 91-98.
CORPORATION AND THE RESOURCE COST OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
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production, the demand for comparable devices currently on the market,
and expert testimony should be in a good position to formulate a fair royalty
rate. Furthermore, as noted above, in the occasional cases of serious
misalignment between the ex ante estimated value and the actual value in
the market place, a court could hear petitions for readjustment of the
licensing fee ex post.
In the past, Congress has considered employing a compulsory license
scheme in place of the current patent regime. For instance, in response to
H.R. 1127, a 1995 bill that proposed a complete moratorium on medical
device and process patents, experts testified in favor of requiring medical
patent owners to "license the technology at a reasonable royalty"; they
believed such a policy to be more narrowly tailored than complete
termination of patent protection as a means of handling the problems that
the bill sought to address. 197 This article finds that if patent law for medical
devices were to be modified, introducing a compulsory licensing system
appears to be one of the most viable alternatives. As such, Congress should
reconsider the issue, especially in light of the technological changes that
have taken place since it was last discussed in 1995.
C. Shortened Patent Terms
The current patent system gains credibility merely because of its historic
existence, which provides the benefits of familiarity and predictability to
potential inventors. 98 Thus, if policymakers fear the repercussions of a
complete institutional overhaul, they still have the alternative of refining
and reducing current patent monopoly rights to better reflect the economic
needs of the medical device industry.' 99 After all, the length of the patent
term, originally derived from the length of apprenticeships, is essentially
arbitrary. The current twenty-year term stands only because of historical
precedent and international treaties devised in accordance with that
duration. 200
Part of the appeal of revising patent protection through manipulation of
the patent term is its simplicity of implementation and administration.
While more complex solutions offer greater opportunities for clever lawyers
to exploit the laws in their clients' favor, changes to duration involve
20 1
unambiguous black letter rules that will apply categorically.
Furthermore, should any initial change to the term prove inefficient in its

197. Katopis, supra note 45, at 358-59 (quoting William D. Noonan, PatentingMedical and
SurgicalProcedures,77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 651, 664 (1995)).

198.
199.
200.
201.

See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 22, at 357.
See id. at 358.
Johnson, supra note 30, at 283.
See id. at 289.
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effects on incentive, "duration has the prospect of allowing infinite
gradations0 2 in making the slight adjustments to the size of the patent
2
reward. ,
The length of the patent term can be tailored to the specific financial
requirements of the medical device industry and the needs of society in
multiple ways. Several scholars have suggested terms of varying length
depending on characteristics of the invention itself or the industry in which
it is categorized. 0 3 Proponents of this plan recommend that policymakers
derive these categories based on two criteria: first, "inventions that share
economic characteristics that are determinants of optimal patent life" should
be grouped together; and second, the categories should be clearly defined
and delineated such that there is little room for debate as to the grouping
into which a given invention falls. 2°4 Under this approach, the economic
and functional characteristics that distinguish medical devices from other
types of technology would place them into the subset of inventions that
should have patent terms on the shorter end of the scale.
Another solution involves expanding monopoly maintenance fees 20 5 in a
manner that would alter the patent owner's calculus of whether preserving
the monopoly is worth the extra cost. 20 6 Such a proposal poses the danger
that the title holders would simply pay the fees and then pass the cost along
to consumers in the form of higher prices. Still, if this strategy were
implemented, any fees collected could be redistributed in the form of
research grants that would obligate the recipient to dedicate their results to
the public domain. A reduced patent term also could be combined with
other forms of compensation, such as a compulsory license after the
shortened strict monopoly period ends.
D. Trade Secret Protection
Presently, firms sometimes decide that taking advantage of trade secret
law is a viable alternative to seeking a patent. While one can logically
assume that in the complete absence of patent law, more firms would
choose trade secret protection, this article does not suggest that abolishing
the current patent regime and relying only on trade secrets is economically
indicated or socially desirable.

202. Id.
203. See, e.g., id. at 286. See also Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 43, at 1632
(focusing on differentiating between industries and tailoring the applicable law accordingly
via doctrines related to patent scope).
204. Johnson, supra note 30, at 292.
205. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g) (2007) (outlining the current schedule of maintenance fees,
which assesses progressively higher levels beginning in the fifth year of patent protection).
206. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 286.
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While trade secret laws can vary slightly from state to state,2 °7 the basic
tradeoff is the same. The duration of the trade secret can be unlimited, as
long as the information is not widely known by the relevant public and the
owner takes reasonable precautions to maintain this confidentiality. 20 8 By
opting for this potentially infinite protection rather than the set twenty-year
patent monopoly, the owner risks a competitor discovering the secret,
creating the invention, and entering into the marketplace; thus dissolving
the original owner's right to protection. 0 9
Therefore, reliance on trade secrets undermines one of the main benefits
of patent law-the public disclosure of information about the innovation.
Others can utilize disclosed information about the invention to build
improvements upon the original immediately or to make competitive
equivalent products once the patent term is over. The time and effort spent
deconstructing and analyzing a medical device, for which the method of
manufacture or means of operation is a trade secret, on the other hand, are
nonproductive expenditures.
While society may gain additional competition and better products
through reverse engineering, the process poses problems. Unfortunately,
the cheaper it is to reverse engineer a competitor's device, the more
tempting it is for a firm to relinquish efforts at original product
development, with a net effect that fewer medical devices would be made.
This article has demonstrated how business dynamics like the first mover
advantage can mitigate disincentives to create in these situations. 210 It
seems unlikely, however, for trade secret protection alone to always
facilitate the optimal level of creation in the medical device context.
Furthermore, the competitive nature of the medical device industry, where
rival firms work on similar problems with similar knowledge bases,
increases the possibility that others will independently create a device that
performs the same function as the one for which trade secret protection is

207. Although a substantial majority of the states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act ("UTSA"), the cause of action for trade secret misappropriation has its origins in
common law. Since this case law sometimes affects modem judicial interpretation of the
provisions of the UTSA, and since some states have only adopted the model code in part or
not at all, different states with different precedent or laws which may construe the terms,
obligations, and rights stemming from the statute in divergent ways. See, e.g., Michael
Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (2007).
208 See Risch, supra note 207, at 11.
209. Under the UTSA, a trade secret is information "that (i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.4., 14 U.L.A. 538 (1968).
210. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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sought. Thus, one can expect that industry participants would be reluctant
to rely solely on trade secret law to protect their interests.
E. Combining Alternative Compensation Systems
The previous four Sections of this Part highlighted the merits of several
alternative means of incentivizing and rewarding inventive efforts, but in
each case noted that replacing the current system with the proposed
alternative alone was unlikely to suffice. This Section, however, argues
that a synergetic effect will occur when elements from two or more of the
possible alternative regimes are incorporated into intellectual property
policy for medical devices. Rather than give a cursory review of all of the
possible combinations of the aforementioned four options, this Section
focuses on what appears to be the most promising arrangements based on
the foregoing discussions.
In a combination system, the discretionary use of a reward system would
remedy any lost incentive due to replacement of the current law with a
decreased patent term or compulsory license. If limited to the medical
device sector, the monetary amount the government would need to generate
would be considerably less than if the reward system were to replace the
overall patent law structure. Furthermore, the reward would not have to be
as large under a combined regime because the limited patent term and/or
revenues from compulsory license fees would cover most fixed costs and
provide part of the incentive to create. This, in turn, would prevent research
efforts from being diverted to non-medical technology avenues. It would
also be more politically feasible than a massive tax increase.
As mentioned above, the federal government currently devotes
considerable expenditures to research in the medical device industry.
Adjusting the relative amount or direction of rewards in response to the
needs of the system and introducing new tax breaks for the industry are
fairly easy changes to make politically. For these reasons, this article
concludes that any new compensation system should feature such
government-sponsored incentives, provided the conferral is subject to
conditions that hasten the rewarded invention's entrance into the public
domain.
An abrupt and complete elimination of the current patent regime for
medical devices is a risky endeavor, both politically and economically. A
more practicable option is to retain the current patent structure nominally,
but amend it to include additional provisions regarding the treatment of
medical devices that advance the normative goals discussed in this article.
Specifically, this article proposes a drastically reduced grant of exclusive

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol17/iss1/7

38

Nugent: Patenting Medical Devices: The Economic Implications of Ethically

2008]

Patenting Medical Devices

monopoly power,2 1' followed by a period of compulsory licensing for the
remainder of the traditional twenty-year term. The monopoly period allows
the inventor to secure first-mover advantages and recover fixed costs, but
the onset of compulsory licensing ensures that the patent owner will
continue to have the incentive to maintain its competitive advantage
through reasonable pricing, uniformly high quality of manufacture, and
sound business practices. Such a system should benefit consumers without
materially altering the incentives of the industry, particularly when
combined with possible compensation through rewards and tax subsidies.
Furthermore, entities that are not confident in the proposed system would
continue to have the option to rely on trade secret protection.2 12
CONCLUSION

This article explores the possibility of patent reform in the specific
context of the medical device industry. It notes that the current patent
regime is not efficiently balancing the social and economic issues at stake
in this area of the law, and establishes that applying special rules to medical
devices would not be wholly unprecedented. The article then considers
possible arguments both for and against implementation of an alternative
compensation regime in the medical device context, eventually making the
case that the expected benefits of an appropriately tailored new regime
would outweigh the potential costs of change. Finally, after evaluating the
relative merits and drawbacks of several different types of alternative
compensation schemes, this article concludes that the optimal option would
be a combined system. Under such a system, the patent holder receives
monopoly control over the invention for a brief term, after which point she
must license the right to manufacture, sell, or use the invention for a
reasonable fee throughout the remainder of the traditional twenty-year
patent duration. Discretionary use of federal funds and tax subsidies are
also permissible under this scheme to correct for any market failures and
provide additional incentives where needed.
There are several advantages to this proposal. First, compared to other
possible measures of restructuring patent law, the combined system that

211. Based on the rapid evolution of medical technology, this article estimates the ideal
exclusivity period to be approximately five years. A congressional committee examining
this issue would have the means to more thoroughly evaluate relevant economic factors and
revise the length of the strict monopoly period accordingly.
212. The rapid evolution of medical technology and high probability of the technology's
obsolescence within a reduced term of exclusivity suggests few firms would favor trade
secret protection. See supra Part V.D. A guaranteed monopoly with continuing returns from
licensing fees may well be preferable to one which, although potentially infinite in duration
and capable of realizing substantial initial returns, ultimately leaves an owner vulnerable to
competition.
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retains the traditional twenty-year patent monopoly duration is likely to face
reduced interest group resistance. Although some major manufacturing
firms would oppose any diminution of their monopoly rights, the proposal
merely alters the nature of patent protection rather than eliminating it
altogether. Therefore, other firms may determine that the cost of lobbying
the legislature to retain the current regime would exceed their expected
losses from the change. Moreover, entities such as consumers' rights
groups and social justice advocates focusing on healthcare issues will exert
countervailing pressure on their representatives in support of the change.
Second, there does not appear to be any valid constitutional objection to this
article's proposal; there is no constitutional mandate that patent protection
take any particular form, provided it lasts only for "limited times."
Congress is empowered to formulate a law such as the one proposed here if
it determines that it will better promote progress in the medical device
industry. While the work contained herein may have application to other
areas by analogy, one of the reasons this article is able to support the
recommended reforms is because of the distinctive dynamics of the medical
device industry. Thus, although there may be a need for broader patent
reform, this article's more modest objective is only to explore the issues and
possible avenues for change in one particular segment of the law.
Nonetheless, policymakers and academics alike are encouraged to reflect on
the concerns, arguments, and potential solutions addressed above when
contemplating either industry-specific or general patent reform.
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